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T
he greatest challenge for the social sciences is to explain
change—or more specifically, social, political, economic,
and organizational change.1 The starting point must be
an account of human learning, which is the fundamental pre-
requisite for explaining such change. The ability to learn is the
main reason for the observed plasticity of human behavior, and
the interaction of learning individuals gives rise to change in
society, polity, economy, and organizations. Because learning is
the main object of inquiry in cognitive science, only a dog-
matic attitude would prevent social scientists interested in phe-
nomena related to change from paying appropriate attention to
its findings. The revolution over the past decades in cognitive
science has produced valuable insights regarding the processes
of individual learning across different types of environments.
This is the main reason why cognitive science is not merely of
peripheral importance for social scientists, but should be the
starting point for any serious discussion of societal change.
In this article, we explore the nature of individual learning
and then proceed with an examination of collective learning
and with a discussion of the emergence of institutions. We
then provide a link between learning and overall economic
performance and, in the end, examine the issue of path
dependence.
Individual Learning
Research in cognitive science during the past decades has
deepened our knowledge of the relationships among brain,
mind, and behavior. In particular, work in the approaches
known as “cognitive neuroscience” has advanced our under-
standing of how brain structures are linked to mental phe-
nomena and observable behavior.2 The cognitive architecture
of Homo sapiens being the product of a long evolutionary
process, a major issue that confronts us is the interplay
between the genetic structure that has evolved in response to
the evolving human environment and the cultural conditions
that are a consequence of the institutional framework delib-
erately created by humans to order their environment.
Because cognitive science is a very young discipline, there
are, not surprisingly, a number of competing explanations for
perception, learning, memory, and attention; even more con-
troversy surrounds overall explanations of the nature of the
cognitive processes and the interplay between mind and
brain. In order to usefully apply cognitive science to political
science, economics, and other social sciences, it is important
to remember the analytical focus of the explanatory enter-
prise. For our purpose—coming to grips with the issue of
societal change—we want to use theory that is sufficiently
analytic to provide the following:
• an empirically testable account of individual learning.
• a satisfactory account of choice processes.
• a foundation for explaining the processes of social 
learning, since the ultimate phenomena of interest are 
political change and economic outcomes.
In light of these criteria, we need not engage certain ques-
tions debated in cognitive science—for example, concept for-
mation, which involves complicated interaction among
genetics, neuroembryology, cellular mechanisms, maturation
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processes, neuronal group formation, and ontogenetic experi-
ence.3 For the most part, we do not need to take a stand on
the details of these processes, since we are concerned only
with conceptualizations that show great variety across social
groups and that can undergo substantial change even within
one generation. The mental operations that underlie this kind
of variety are creative and flexible, so we are restricting our
claims to them and the malleable mental representations they
produce. We do not dive into the contentious debate over
concepts that are much more basic and, in many cases, evi-
dently universal across the species (such as basic force dynam-
ics, certain aspects of the structure of color, chase play, et
cetera). 
The approach that we suggest views the mind as a complex
structure that actively interprets and, at the same time, classifies
the varied signals received by the senses. The mind classifies the
experiences from the physical environment as well as those
from the sociocultural-linguistic environment.4 A wide variety
of mental representations have been offered as cognitive mod-
els to describe the mental operations that are of interest here.5
In spite of the ongoing and as yet inconclusive debate among
the proponents of the different conceptualizations of mental
models,6 we find that the pragmatic notion of mental models is
the most appropriate for the explanatory purposes here. Mental
models gradually evolve during our cognitive development to
organize our perceptions and keep track of our memories. As
flexible knowledge structures, they are typically formed by an
organism in pragmatic response to a problem situation, in
order to explain and interpret its environment.7
A mental model can best be understood as the final predic-
tion that the mind makes or expectation that it has regarding
the environment before getting feedback from it. Depending
on whether the expectation formed is validated by the envi-
ronmental feedback, the mental model can be revised,
refined, or rejected altogether. Learning is the complex mod-
ification of the mental models according to the feedback
received from the environment. The unique feature of human
learning is that the modification of mental models goes hand
in hand with “representational redescription,”8 a process in
which knowledge stored as the solution to a special problem
of the environment is subsequently reordered to serve as the
solution to a wide variety of problems.
The formation of mental models and the testing of solu-
tions to problems in the environment do not necessarily lead
to success, however. Learning is an evolutionary process of
trial and error,9 and failure to solve a problem leads to the trial
of a new solution. Because mental models are generally flexi-
ble cognitive structures that help humans solve their prob-
lems, it is interesting to consider further the relationship
between environmental feedback and the stabilization or
modification of mental models.
When environmental feedback confirms the same mental
model many times, it becomes stabilized, in a way. We call
this relatively crystallized mental model a “belief ”; and we call
the interconnection of beliefs (which can be either consistent
or inconsistent) a “belief system.” Having enabled an individ-
ual to survive in his or her environment in the past, the belief
system becomes connected with the motivational system. To
put it another way: the belief system is progressively shaped
by the involvement of a parallel emotional adaptation, and it
therefore takes on the character of a general filter for all new
stimulus processing, so one may safely hypothesize that it is
relatively resistant to abrupt changes. 
When a solution produced on the basis of a certain mental
model has not succeeded, an individual employs inferential
strategies—especially analogies—in a quasi-automatic way.10
If these strategies do not solve the problem either, then the
individual is forced to become creative—that is, to form new
mental models and try new solutions. This is the case of
choice, best conceptualized as the mental probing of alterna-
tives in order to solve a new problem.11
Environmental feedback plays a primary role in determin-
ing the success or failure—and the subsequent incremental
stabilization or modification—of the underlying mental
models. In sum, whether creative choice or learning will take
place depends crucially on the environmental feedback that
the individual mind receives while trying to solve its prob-
lems. Obviously, nothing guarantees that the reception of
environmental feedback will occur accurately. Because the
mind actively interprets all sensory input, the message regard-
ing the success or failure of the solution attempted will often
be misinterpreted. Indeed, the persistence throughout history
of dogmas, myths, superstitions, and ideologies based on such
flawed belief systems calls us to pay as much attention to
learning that produces such beliefs as we do to learning that
appears to interpret correctly the problems confronting
humans.
The theory that we suggest here needs further elaboration,
of course. But it provides, we think, a useful starting point for
building our analytical framework because it meets all three
criteria previously proposed. It gives a more or less satisfacto-
ry account of both individual learning and choice processes,
while providing a sufficient basis in order to explain the
processes of social learning, to which we turn now.
Collective Learning and Change
Learning at the societal level can be best conceptualized as a
process of shared or collective learning. When we attempt to
explain the emergence of social or cultural knowledge, we
must distinguish two aspects of shared learning: the static and
the evolutionary. 
In the static dimension, individuals in a given sociocultural
environment continually communicate with other individu-
als while trying to solve their problems. The direct result of
this communication is the formation of shared mental mod-
els,12 which provide the framework for a common interpreta-
tion of reality and give rise to collective solutions to the prob-
lems arising in the environment. The importance of this
process is obvious: a common interpretation of reality is the
foundation of any further social interaction.
What about the evolution of the shared mental models in a
social group over time? The evolution of shared mental
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models—that is, shared or collective learning—depends on
the group size and is therefore different within organizations
and in the society overall. Shared learning first takes place
within families, neighborhoods, and schools (that is, within
organizations). The modern theory of organizational learning
views organizations as systems of distributed knowledge in
which capabilities are shared through knowledge exchange.13
At the level of society, the process of cultural evolution con-
cerns the growth and transmission of knowledge in time.
Merlin Donald stresses the importance of “External Symbolic
Storage” for the transmission and accumulation of knowledge
across generations. The critical innovation that has massively
supported the evolution of “theoretic” culture is the simple
habit of recording ideas—i.e., of “externalizing the process of
oral commentary and events.” This phenomenon occurred 
in China, India, Egypt, and Mesopotamia for at least a thou-
sand years before it took hold in ancient Greece, at around 700
B.C. The new element then was that “for the first time in his-
tory complex ideas were placed in the public arena, in an
external medium, where they could undergo refinement over
the longer term, that is, well beyond the life-span of single
individuals.”14 These External Symbolic Storage networks have
decisively driven forward theoretical knowledge—knowledge
communicable by means of symbols (natural and artificial)—
because they provide the possibility of a constant interaction
between the corpus of theoretical-scientific knowledge and the
theoretical problems of the individuals in a society.
The stock of knowledge transmitted from generation to
generation is not limited to theoretical knowledge, however.
The other category of knowledge—practical knowledge, or
“knowing how”15—is not expressible in linguistic terms; the
mechanism of its transmission is the direct imitation of the
performance of others. Practical knowledge refers to all skills
acquired by solving practical problems—swimming, cooking,
riding a bicycle, driving a car, typing a paper—and is equally
important for the everyday life of all individuals in a society.16
As collective learning takes place at the societal level, the
problem-solving capacity of the society, encompassing both
theoretical-scientific and practical knowledge, grows and is
transmitted over time. There is, however, a subcategory of
practical knowledge—the knowledge concerning the solution
of social problems of human interaction—that in many cases
cannot be understood as having grown through time. At this
point, we must go beyond Friedrich A. von Hayek, who
equated the growth of civilization with the growth of knowl-
edge, including “our habits and skills, our emotional atti-
tudes, our tools and our institutions—all adaptations to past
experience which have grown up by selective elimination of
less suitable contact.”17 We must develop a more analytic
understanding of societal institutions and examine in some
depth how they evolve.
Collective Learning and the 
Emergence of Institutions
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more for-
mally, the humanly devised constraints that structure human
interaction. They consist of formal rules (constitutions,
statute and common law, and regulations), informal rules
(conventions, moral rules, and social norms), and the enforce-
ment characteristics of each. Because they make up the incen-
tive structure of a society, they define the way the game is
played through time. When theorizing about institutions, it is
useful to distinguish between two aspects: external and 
internal.
From an external point of view, institutions are shared
behavioral regularities or shared routines within a population.
From an internal point of view, they are nothing more than
shared mental models or shared solutions to recurrent prob-
lems of social interaction. Only because institutions are
anchored in people’s minds do they ever become behaviorally
relevant. The elucidation of the internal aspect is the crucial
step in adequately explaining the emergence, evolution, and
effects of institutions; it is this that makes for the qualitative
difference between a cognitive approach to institutions and
other approaches. Although, for example, the rational choice
approach sheds some light on cognitive processes, it does so
in a standardized way, viewing all mental events as choices
that lead to actions. While paying due attention to choice
phenomena, the cognitive approach to institutions does not
insist on their rationality as judged by some external standard,
nor does it neglect the wider range of mental processes—
analogical reasoning, skill formation, et cetera—that play a
crucial role in the emergence of shared solutions to recurrent
problems of social interaction (i.e., institutions).
Institutions have diverse effects. One is the provision of
incentives to create organizations. Here, it is useful to distin-
guish institutions from organizations. Institutions are the
rules of the game; organizations are the players. The latter
consist of groups of individuals bound together by some com-
mon objective. For example, firms are economic organiza-
tions, political parties are political organizations, and univer-
sities are educational organizations. As shared mental models
evolve within organizations, collective learning takes place
with respect to their goals.18
The emergence of informal and formal institutions is driv-
en by distinct mechanisms. A society’s informal institutions
emerge and change in a process of spontaneous interaction
and are “indeed the result of human action, but not the exe-
cution of any human design.”19 The spontaneous emergence
of informal institutions is a process of innovation and imita-
tion that takes place in a social group that is learning collec-
tively. Individuals respecting conventions, following moral
rules, and adopting social norms cause (as an unintended 
outcome of their action) the emergence of social order. In
close-knit groups, informal institutions largely suffice to sta-
bilize expectations and provide discipline, because the mem-
bers of the group engage in personal relationships.20 In prim-
itive societies, informal institutions alone can establish social
order; and often there is no need for additional institutions
with an explicit third-party enforcement mechanism. 
This brings us to one of the core issues in political science:
the reasons for state existence. States exist because they provide
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individuals with solutions to the twin problems of trust and
protection from aggression (by individuals of the same socie-
ty and ones of different societies). A state emerges once a soci-
ety grows bigger and relationships among the members
become increasingly impersonal. In cases of larger groups or
societies, trust becomes scarce since the discipline of reciproc-
ity and the “shadow of the future” are relatively low.
Individuals capable of learning are bound to realize that when
they act within a large group, the probability of dealing with
a defector increases. Because—as we have explained above—
the content of an individual’s learning depends decisively on
environmental feedback, individuals acting in a large group
(e.g., a modern, complex society) will acquire different lessons
than will those in a small group (e.g., a primitive tribe). This
differentiated learning process is central to whether the state
emerges as an agency of enforcement.
In a large society, for instance, with its advancing imper-
sonalization, it is sufficient for the process of state emergence
to begin if a creative individual starts cheating on the prom-
ises given by the rest of the group members, realizing the
potential benefit of defection.
Others will imitate him; and
after some time, an increas-
ingly large number of free
riders will come to be. As a
consequence, the environ-
mental input of the other
(noncheating or moral) indi-
viduals will change. They will have collectively learned that
cooperation is beneficial, but that defectors exist in increasing
numbers, and that the costs of punishing the defectors have
increased because there are so many.
This collective lesson has an important implication: in
order to prevent free riding, a demand for protection will arise.
Each individual will try to solve this practical problem by call-
ing for violence against free riders. The satisfaction of this
demand can take place in two ways: either every single indi-
vidual will consume some of his productive capacity and time
in order to form coalitions against free riders each time they
defect, or an agency that specializes in protection against free
riders will emerge. Considering the immense transaction costs
in the first scenario, it is plausible to hypothesize that some
creative individuals will establish and run a business provid-
ing protection.
There is no reason to assume that only one protective
agency will emerge. On the contrary, many such agencies will
exist within a society, trading their protection against free rid-
ers for money or other goods. The peculiarity of this good is
that violence offers, in fact, the opportunity to the protective
agencies to oppress the same group members that it is meant
to protect. The entrepreneurs running those agencies are
bound only by the informal rules of the game that are relevant
for all members of the society in question—i.e., the conven-
tions, moral rules, and social norms prevalent at the time.
Since only informal rules of the game exist, and the entre-
preneurs have access to a violence mechanism, three kinds of
relationships are possible among the protective agencies: they
may cooperate with one another, compete, or remain indif-
ferent. In a trial-and-error process, they will engage in all pos-
sible relationships, ranging from armed battles to complete
fusion of protective agencies in order to obtain better control
over the customers. The outcome of this evolutionary process
cannot be fully determined ex ante, since it depends on the
creativity of the entrepreneurs (or rulers), their estimated
chances to win the battles, and the effectiveness of their con-
trol over their customers. 
We must cautiously address the question of whether only
one protective agency will prevail in the end, successfully 
claiming a monopoly through the legitimate use of force in a
territory.21 The monopoly view of the state is only partly
correct. It is surely fallacious if the alleged monopoly of
force is meant to cover the whole society or cultural 
community—that is, all individuals with shared mental mod-
els and informal institutions. Historical counterexamples
include the independent Greek city-states of antiquity and
the feuds in the Middle Ages.22 In a narrower sense, however,
the argument concerning the
monopoly of force is correct:
the protective agencies possess
a monopoly over the group of
individuals that they protect.23
The cooperative or competi-
tive processes among different
protective agencies, each one
using a monopoly of force over its own group of clients, can—
but do not necessarily—lead to a monopolistic outcome.
Thus, in an evolutionary process characterized by collec-
tive learning, division of labor, and competition or coopera-
tion among entrepreneurs, one or more protective agencies
remain in the society. Since their primary function is to offer
protection in exchange for goods or money, they constitute
the protective state or states taxing constituents for the sup-
plied protection. But isn’t there any difference between pro-
tective agencies and protective states? The only analytically
important one seems to be that protective agencies appear at
the first stages of the evolutionary process, whereas protec-
tive states are, in a way, the outcome of that process. Greater
stability is characteristic of the protective state, since both
rulers and citizens have already gone through a learning
process. Citizens have realized that the costs of exiting a pro-
tective state are quite high (if exit is not explicitly allowed by
the rulers24); and rulers have learned how other rulers react
and which technologies of oppression are most successful.
The difference is therefore one of degree rather than of
kind.25
This evolutionary view is compatible with human history’s
great diversity. In Western Europe, there was never a hegemon
after the death of Charlemagne, but there was always a plu-
rality of rulers engaged permanently in war. Regional 
hegemons did prevail, however, over prolonged historical
periods, as in the Ming and Manchu dynasties in China, and
the Roman Empire.26
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States exist because they provide individuals
with solutions to the twin problems of trust and
protection from aggression. 
To summarize and amplify: informal institutions are pro-
duced internally—that is, they are endogenous to a commu-
nity.27 By comparison, formal institutions are imposed exter-
nally onto the community as the exogenous product of the
evolution of relationships among rulers. We lack a general
theory of how political markets work and how protective
states come to assume more and more functions, offering a
bundle of public goods rather than merely protection.
Though recent developments in political science have pro-
duced valuable predictions of political outcomes,28 these
apply mainly to the United States and other developed poli-
ties, which operate in a network of fundamental constitu-
tional and other political rules that remain the “unstable con-
stants” in the short run.29 A more general theory of politics
would explore the transaction-cost characteristics of political
markets and the role of ideology in shaping political out-
comes.30 A theory of ideology with empirical content, which
has yet to be developed, could have as a starting point the
evolution of the shared mental models of the political actors
that give rise to and legitimize new political rules, which in
turn structure human interaction.31 Choice processes would
obviously be a constitutive part of such a theory, but not nec-
essarily in the form propagated by rational choice theorists
within political science. The issue is not whether individual
or collective choices are to be classified as “rational” by some
external normative standard, but to work out how belief sys-
tems are shared and how distributed cognition solves collec-
tive problems faced by social groups.
The relationship between formal and informal institutions
is very important for policy reasons.32 Since policies consist of
changes in formal institutions, but outcomes are a result of
changes in both formal and informal rules (as well as enforce-
ment characteristics), learning more about the interaction
between formal and informal rules is a necessary condition for
improving economic performance.
Economic Performance
Once rules are established, the next analytic step is to see how
economic markets evolve within the institutional framework.
Depending on the kind of institutions that prevail and their
enforcement characteristics, the creation, diffusion, and divi-
sion of knowledge will occur with either high or low transac-
tion costs. Appropriate institutions, through the stabilization
of expectations, lead to greater security in transactions. This
process goes hand in hand with low transaction costs, better
captured gains of trade, and in the end, higher economic per-
formance.33
One can best illustrate this general argument by distin-
guishing between exchange and competition, and examining
how they are related to knowledge division, knowledge cre-
ation, and transaction costs. Neoclassical economic theory
seldom addresses this issue, and economists often use the con-
cepts of “market” and “competition” synonymously. We
define markets as exchange processes and competition as the
rivalry that can take place not only in markets, but also in pol-
itics and organizations—wherever two or more individuals
strive to reach the same end. We will first examine how insti-
tutions, market exchange, and the dissemination of knowl-
edge are interrelated. Then we will address how the institu-
tional framework affects market competition and leads to the
growth and the accumulation of knowledge.
The exchange processes give rise to a division of labor,
which is concomitant with a division of knowledge, among
market participants.34 The fact that different individuals pos-
sess different bits of knowledge because each specializes in a
specific trade or employment poses two difficult theoretical
problems: coordination of knowledge and its effective use. We
have stressed before that institutions are anchored in the
minds of people as shared solutions to social problems. The
main effect of the existence of shared mental models or shared
knowledge regarding the human landscape at the cognitive
level is a coordination of individual activities at the behavioral
level. The members of a society build the same cognitive
structures and adopt respective behavioral regularities during
a long evolutionary socialization process. Thus, an individual
who starts exchanging in the market already shares social rules
with the other market participants. He is not an ahistorical
being equipped solely with preferences that maximize utility
under the constraints of, for example, given prices and avail-
able income.
During the socialization process, individuals have learned
the conventions, moral rules, and social norms of their socie-
ty. When they start their business, entrepreneurs have learned
which legal rules they have to respect and the point to which
property rights are protected or violated by the state; they are
already the “legal persons” of legal theory. By having the same
learning history, entrepreneurs and the other market partici-
pants share formal and informal institutions and thus the
rules of the game. This makes them the specific agents of a
specific economic game.
Hence, institutions are responsible for coordinating the
knowledge of market participants at a first and most impor-
tant level. Clearly, depending on the characteristics of the
shared learning process in specific societies, this coordination
of knowledge will take place at a different level of transaction
costs.35 The institutional framework of a Moroccan suq, for
example, coordinates the knowledge of the market partici-
pants at higher transaction costs than the elaborate institu-
tional framework of more differentiated markets—for
instance, in the developed countries of the West. 
At a second level, the coordination of knowledge in mar-
kets takes place with the aid of prices. The old Hayekian argu-
ment holds true: the existence of prices in market settings
greatly facilitates the further coordination of market partici-
pants’ knowledge in comparison with36 settings without mar-
ket prices—as, for example, in socialistic economic systems.
The coordination of knowledge in markets is, thus, due to
both the institutional framework and the prices that prevail in
the specific market game.
In considering the role of the market in the accumulation
of knowledge, one must look at what happens during the
exchange between supply and demand, provided that all 
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market participants know the rules of the game. The
exchange is a communication process, during which con-
sumers and entrepreneurs form shared mental models. Thus,
entrepreneurs and consumers do not at the outset share “com-
mon knowledge.”37 Neither is there a fictitious auctioneer
who cares that each side of the market becomes aware of the
other. The very rise of the common structure of communica-
tion is the prerequisite of any exchange act. Since entrepre-
neurs will not always provide correct hypotheses concerning
the consumers’ problems, and consumers cannot possibly
know all available alternatives in the markets, exchange acts
are always “imperfect.”
To prevent a possible misunderstanding here, we want to
emphasize that the shared mental models in the exchange
process are different from those that comprise the internal
forms of social institutions, although they are of the same
cognitive material. The distinguishing feature of the internal-
ized rules of the game is that they are shared by all market
participants. The mental models that become shared in the
exchange process are, conversely, of a more temporary charac-
ter; and more important, they are shared between only some
consumers and some entrepreneurs. The existence of prices
facilitates the formation of these kinds of shared mental mod-
els during the exchange process.
Generally, the more shared mental models are formed in
the market with low transaction costs, the more effective the
use of knowledge in the economy will be. This argument
needs further elaboration. Bertin Martens discusses the
dilemma that specialized agents with limited cognitive capac-
ity face in the division of knowledge-setting in the market.38
Agents can either devote more of that scarce capacity to
acquiring common knowledge and forming shared mental
models with other agents or build up their own specialization.
Transaction costs affect which option agents will choose. A
high frequency of exchange acts and a deepening of the divi-
sion of knowledge lead to a greater realization of the gains of
trade and, in the end, to higher economic performance.
Having examined how institutions, market exchange, and
the dissemination of knowledge are interrelated, we will now
see how the institutional framework affects market competi-
tion. What kind of competition prevails during the process of
exchange depends crucially on the institutions that prevail at
the time. Institutions determine not only the kind of com-
petitive game, but also its tempo. So the players’ tempo of
learning depends on the intensity of the competition, which
is in turn set by the institutional framework.39 Because of
competition, the agents suffering from pecuniary external
effects are motivated to learn more to ensure their survival in
the economic struggle.
During the competitive process, technologies are generated
as a spontaneous outcome. Why spontaneous? Because the
organizations that participate in the economic game—that is,
firms—are primarily concerned with increasing their profits.
In the process of solving this primary problem, they employ a
very wide range of competitive parameters. Technology is just
one of them. Scientific knowledge is used, and also partly
produced, by firms only to the degree that entrepreneurs
expect economic profits from its use. So the generation of
technologies is mediated by the market test—that is, by prof-
itability considerations. This is why there is no simple causal
link among institutions, organizational activity, and the gen-
eration of technologies.40
The economic competitive process that generates technolo-
gies and thus new knowledge is, of course, linked to market
exchange. In order for the technologies to be effective, there
must be an appropriate absorptive capacity on the demand side
of the market.41 In other words, the results of the competitive
process on the supply side in the form of new technologies
can be wealth-enhancing only if the demand side can use
them. This fact has profound implications for the important
policy issue of the transmission of new technologies, especial-
ly in the less developed parts of the world. The transfer of
technologies can be accomplished only if the appropriate
learning processes have taken place on the receiving end.42
Thus, communication and the formation of respective shared
mental models is a prerequisite of any effective use of tech-
nologies.43
In summary, economic performance is the outcome of a
complex process of playing the economic game according to
formal and informal rules that provide incentive structures
and channel innovative activities in a certain direction. There
is no guarantee that the processes of shared learning and 
the institutions of a society that evolve over time will produce
economic growth.44 In history the stories of failure are more
frequent than the stories of success. And it is important to
understand that even if we did have it right for one economy,
it would not automatically be right for another; and even if
we have it right today, it will not necessarily be right tomor-
row. Only if we understand the principal factors that produce
path dependence can we hope to be able to alter economic
performance in a particular direction.
Path Dependence: Cognitive,
Institutional, and Economic
The process of societal change that we presented in this arti-
cle can be summarized as follows:
“reality” > beliefs > institutions > specific policies >
outcomes (and, thus, altered “reality”)
The feedback mechanism from outcomes to reality runs
through the human mind; and because the mind interprets
reality actively, we have a very limited knowledge of how out-
comes will be perceived and interpreted by agents. This is the
main reason why mechanistic, deterministic models of eco-
nomic change cannot work: ideas are the autonomous factors
of socioeconomic evolution, and if we want to learn more
about this process, we need to know more about the way our
minds construct reality.
Nevertheless, we can formulate a hypothesis about how the
“scaffolding” that humans erect relates to outcomes while it
continues to evolve over time. After a period t1 (that is, after
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learning through institutions, markets, and outcomes has been
completed), the mind interprets in the period t2 reality (that is,
the outcomes) on the basis of the mental models already exist-
ing in t1. Obviously, this is true for each individual in the soci-
ety, so the shared learning in t2 must be based on what has
already been there in t1. In other words, the shared mental
models in t2 are formed on the basis of the shared mental mod-
els in t1. In cases when the content of the shared learning is the
same or similar over a number of periods, the mental models
become relatively inflexible and shared belief systems are
shaped. These are in turn the source of cognitive path depend-
ence, since the more inflexible the mental models are, the more
difficult their modification and revision become.
Because of this cognitive path dependence, the scaffolding
of the human landscape (i.e., the formation of institutions)
also takes place in a path-dependent way. Once all of the play-
ers have formed the same mental models, the institutional
mix may start solving a variety of social problems in a partic-
ular way. One can speak of the “increasing returns of an insti-
tutional framework” in the sense that once the problem solu-
tions are learned by agents, they are unconsciously applied
each time similar problems arise. This institutional path
dependence may structure the economic game in a standard-
ized way through time and lead societies to play a game that
results in undesirable consequences.45
As long as the institutional framework and the incentive
structure remain constant, market interaction will be chan-
neled into a certain direction and the generation of certain
types of technologies will be encouraged. Thus, cognitive and
institutional path dependence will ultimately lead to econom-
ic path dependence. The intuitively formulated proposition
that “history matters” designates the importance of the phe-
nomenon of path dependence, starting at the cognitive level,
going through the institutional level, and culminating at the
economic level.46
Conclusion
The analytical framework presented here provides a first
approximation of the role that learning plays in the formation
of institutions and in the economic games unfolded within
them. Further research is needed in order to develop theories
of how political markets function, of the emergence and effects
of ideology, and of the relations between formal and informal
institutions. For all of these research areas, the issue of learn-
ing is of crucial importance. This is why we will have to keep
track of the developments in cognitive science and use its find-
ings for our own explanatory purposes, as we move toward a
more refined theory—one operational enough to be employed
for policy issues.
Notes 
1 Versions of this article have been presented at the
Second Knexus Research Symposium on Institutional-
ization of Knowledge at the Institute for International
Studies, Stanford University, in August 2000; at the
Cognition, Learning, and Social Change workshop in
Arlington, Virginia, in October 2000; at the Beliefs,
Institutions, and Social Change workshop at
Washington University, St. Louis, in December 2000;
at the Politics, Markets, and Social Change workshop
at Stanford University, in February 2001; at the fifth
annual conference of the International Society for
New Institutional Economics at the University of
California, Berkeley, in September 2001; at the Insti-
tutions and Institutional Change workshop at the
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective
Goods, in October 2001; and at the annual meeting
of the American Political Science Association in
Boston, in September 2002. We thank all participants
of the above workshops and sessions for their helpful
comments and suggestions. We are particularly grate-
ful for valuable comments by Jim Alt, Martin
Beckenkamp, Jeannette Colyvas, Bob Cooter, Leda
Cosmides, Tyler Cowen, Frank Dobbin, Merlin
Donald, Paul Edwards, Christoph Engel, Jean
Ensminger, Henry Farrell, Alexander Field, Neil
Fligstein, Mark Granovetter, Avner Greif, Peter Hall,
Adrienne Heritier, David Holloway, Katharina
Holzinger, Ron Jepperson, Jim Johnson, Phil Keefer,
Sukkoo Kim, Jack Knight, Anjini Kochar, Timur
Kuran, Dick Langlois, David Laitin, Margaret Levi,
Stefan Magen, Kevin McCabe, Dan McFarland, Jim
March, Bertin Martens, Terry Moe, Joel Mokyr,
Wolfgang C. Müller, John Nye, John Padgett, Perri 6,
Paul Pierson, Woody Powell, Birger Priddat, Nathan
Rosenberg, Norman Schofield, Richard Scott,
Christian Schubert, Itai Sened, Paul Sniderman, Alec
Stone Sweet, John Tooby, Mark Turner, Morten
Vendelo, Karen Vaughn, Barry Weingast, Gavin
Wright, Jennifer Hochschild, and three anonymous
reviewers.
2 Damasio 1999.
3 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggest-




6 See, e.g., Fetzer 1999a; Fetzer 1999b; Johnson-Laird
1997a; Johnson-Laird 1997b; Johnson-Laird and Byrne
1999; Rips 1994; Rips 1997.
7 Holland et al. 1986.
8 Clark and Karmiloff-Smith 1993.
9 Popper 1992 [1972].
10 Nisbett and Ross 1980; Holyoak and Thagard 1995;
Gentner et al. 2001.
11 See Mantzavinos 2001. As the cognitive neuroscientist
Elkhonon Goldberg puts it (in Goldberg 2001, 44): 
The brains of higher animals, including humans, are endowed
with a powerful capacity of learning. Unlike instinctive behavior,
learning, by definition, is change. The organism encounters a sit-
uation for which it has no ready-made effective response. With
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repeated exposures to similar situations over time, appropriate
response strategies emerge. The length of time, or the number of
exposures required for the emergence of effective solutions, is
vastly variable. The process is sometimes condensed in a single
exposure (the so-called Aha! Reaction). But invariably, the tran-
sition is from an absence of effective behavior to the emergence
of effective behavior. This process is called “learning” and the
emergent (or taught) behavior is called “learned behavior.” At an
early stage of every learning process the organism is faced with
“novelty,” and the end stage of the learning process can be
thought of as “routinization” or “familiarity.” The transition
from novelty to routinization is the universal cycle of our inner
world. It is the rhythm of our mental processes unfolding on var-
ious time scales [our italics]. 
12 Denzau and North 1994.
13 March 1999.
14 Donald 1991, 342, 344.
15 Ryle 1949.
16 This distinction between theoretical and practical 
knowledge parallels the one between declarative and
procedural knowledge drawn in cognitive psychology.
See, e.g., Anderson 1993, chapters 2–4. For evidence
that the difference between “knowing that” and
“knowing how” is honored by our nervous system, see
Cohen and Squire 1980.
17 Hayek 1960, 26.
18 Powell and DiMaggio 1991.
19 Ferguson 1966 [1767], 188. 
20 For substantial empirical work on this issue, see
Ostrom 1990 and Ostrom et al. 1994.
21 Weber 1972 [1922], 29.
22 In ancient Greece, for example, we have a clear case
of a cultural community with similar or even identical
informal institutions; it is well known that Greeks
identified themselves as nonbarbarians and that a
Greek was defined as anybody sharing the Greek cul-
ture. This, however, went hand in hand with a great
variety of protective agencies in the form of city-states
that offered protection in an autonomous way, period-
ically engaging in all kinds of relationships with one
another. So here is a case in which a monopoly of
force does not cover the whole cultural community.
The feuds in the Middle Ages provide an obvious
similar case.
23 It is important to note that the reason for this monop-
oly does not have anything to do with economic argu-
ments concerning economies of scale and the like.
There is no evidence that protection is an industry that
could be considered a natural monopoly. Rather, the
monopoly of force is to be explained by reference to
the ability of the protective agency to oppress its clients
and compel them to accept its protection solely. See
Green 1990. On the role of relative bargaining power,
transaction costs, and discount rates in regulating the
relationship between rulers and constituencies, see Levi
1988, especially chapter 2.
24 Throughout most of human history, rulers have not al-
lowed their citizens to leave their jurisdictions, because
they have had an interest in taxing them. The excep-
tion is when rulers feel that their authority is being
doubted. The tolerance that Castro’s Cuba showed to
emigrants from time to time and ostracism in ancient
Greek cities are examples of exit allowance. For the
argument in the text, it is crucial that exit is not free,
but can only be permitted (or even commanded) by
the ruler. Finer 1974.
25 The model of state emergence that we outline in the
text has strong affinities to Nozick’s model (1974),
though he has primarily developed it in order to
draw normative conclusions that are not of interest
here.
26 See Jones 1981. Our model is not meant to deny
that in the modern world more complex forms of
governance are prevalent. In most modern national
polities, many private and public entities are author-
ized to monitor and enforce rules. In a national
park, the rules will be enforced by a federal park
ranger; in a state park, by a state park ranger; in a
country park, by a country sheriff; in a city park, by
city police. All of these units have considerable
autonomy. The evolutionary path of some political
systems leads toward strong centralized national insti-
tutions that dominate in an authoritarian manner,
while the evolutionary path of others leads to a wide
variety of political institutions nested at multiple lev-
els. (On the issue of polycentricity of political order,
see McGinnis 1999a; McGinnis 1999b; McGinnis
2000.) However, we focus in the text primarily on
the state, because it is the most important form of
governance.
27 Lipford and Yandle 1997.
28 Katznelson and Milner 2002.
29 Riker 1980.
30 North 1990b.
31 For a first serious attempt in this direction, see Hall
1993.
32 Nee 1998 and Nee and Ingram 1998 are first at-









41 Cohen and Levinthal 1990.
42 Wright 1997.
43 Here lies a crucial difference between our theory and
the endogenous growth theory (e.g., Romer 1986;
Romer 1993; Romer 1994; Lucas 1988; Lucas 1993).
44 North 1994.
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45 North 2000; Pierson 2000.
46 Mantzavinos 2001.
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